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INTRODUCTION
Growing up, schoolchildren are often taught that the world is mostly
covered by water. While this is true, only 2.5% of the world’s water is
actually usable freshwater.1 Of the world’s freshwater, 68.7% is currently
trapped in glaciers or ice caps.2 Only 1.2% is surface water—water located
on the surface of the planet contained in lakes, streams, and rivers.3 The
remaining 30% is groundwater, which is water found under the earth’s
surface.4 Those areas with groundwater resources often rely on them heavily
for uses such as drinking water and agriculture. For instance, about 90% of
the water that Mississippians use on a daily basis is groundwater.5 Similarly,
Memphis, Tennessee is second only to San Antonio, Texas among U.S. cities
in the amount of groundwater it uses.6
The United States has multiple aquifers that underlie more than one
state. As water resources are becoming increasingly stressed by climate
change, interstate water disputes are becoming more common. The Supreme
Court of the United States has developed a common law framework for
resolving disputes over interstate surface water resources, known as
“equitable apportionment.”7 However, the Court has never resolved a dispute
over interstate groundwater resources. Mississippi v. Tennessee, a case over

1. Where Is Earth’s Water?, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, https://www.usgs.gov/special
-topic/water-science-school/science/where-earths-water?qt-science_center_objects=0#qtscience_center_objects [https://perma.cc/BYA8-2E4H].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. THOMAS E. REILLY ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., GROUND-WATER AVAILABILITY
IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (2008).
6. J.V. BRAHANA & R.E. BROSHEARS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURV., HYDROGEOLOGY AND GROUND-WATER FLOW IN THE MEMPHIS AND FORT PILLOW
AQUIFERS IN THE MEMPHIS AREA, TENN. WATER-RESOURCES INVESTIGATIONS REP. 89-4131 2
(2001).
7. Catherine Janasie, Mississippi v. Tennessee Case Update, NAT’L SEA GRANT L. CTR.
(Oct. 19, 2018), http://nsglc.olemiss.edu/blog/archive/2018/oct/19/index.html [https://
perma.cc/2YN4-EYVP].
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the use of groundwater in the Sparta Aquifer (which underlies MS, TN, AL,
AR, LA, and TX), is the first case of its kind.8
Mississippi is concerned with the City of Memphis pumping
groundwater close to the MS-TN border.9 Pumping a large amount of
groundwater changes the flow of water, causing more water to flow towards
the point(s) of extraction in one state, thus lowering the water table of
neighboring states.10 Mississippi claims Memphis’s water extraction has
caused billions of gallons of water to leave Mississippi.11 Importantly,
Mississippi is not treating the aquifer as an interstate resource that should be
shared.12 Instead, the state is claiming the groundwater is state property that
Memphis is “stealing.” As a result, Mississippi is asking the Court for over
$600 million in monetary damage.13
Tennessee is claiming the water is an interstate resource, and thus,
the equitable apportionment framework should apply to the case.14 Under that
framework, neither state has any right to the water until the Court apportions
the water.15 The doctrine’s basis is that each state is entitled to “equality of
right,” not equal amounts of water.16 Importantly, since it is an equitable
remedy, the state of Mississippi would not be able to seek monetary remedies
under this doctrine.
Mississippi’s approach to the case has left many scratching their
heads about why it did not include equitable apportionment in its complaint.
The answer may lie in the fact that the state may have a hard time establishing
a sufficient injury compared to Memphis’s need to rely on groundwater.
Further, the state may have not sought equitable apportionment because it
wanted to pursue monetary damages.
However, there are serious issues with how Mississippi has framed
its case. Besides its assertion that the state owns the groundwater underlying
land within its borders, Mississippi relies heavily on its argument that surface
water and groundwater are different. States have traditionally regulated the
two resources separately; however, Mississippi regulates both through a
permit system. The state’s argument is further weakened by the fact that it
relies on two surface water legal doctrines to help make its case: the equal
footing doctrine and the public trust doctrine.
Further, Mississippi claims that it is best left to manage its own
groundwater resources.17 This shines a spotlight on Mississippi’s own
management regime. While the state was progressive in adopting a permit
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Janasie, supra note 7.
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system for both surface and groundwater in 1985, Mississippi has not
enforced the terms of these permits.18 Thus, groundwater in the state
continues to be mined, with resources in the Delta seriously strained.
This case is noteworthy in its novelty, but it also draws light on each
state’s management of its water resources. As surface water resources
continue to be further stressed due to changing climates, we are going to
increasingly need to depend on groundwater, especially within large
interstate aquifers. This paper will first provide a brief overview of water law,
including the frameworks governing surface water, groundwater, and
interstate disputes. Next, the paper will examine the management of water in
both Mississippi and Tennessee, as well as give the history of the Mississippi
v. Tennessee lawsuit. The paper then discusses the problem with Mississippi
relying on surface water doctrines to make ownership claims over
groundwater. Finally, the paper considers why Mississippi may not have
pursued equitable apportionment.
I. WATER LAW BASICS
Water law provides the framework that guides our decisions about
who can use freshwater resources and for what purpose.19 Water use is
generally regulated on the state level—states get to determine their own rules
on how to allocate the water within their borders.20
While water law is mostly state law based, the Supreme Court of the
United States has developed a framework, known as equitable
apportionment, to resolve water disputes between states.
The law has treated surface water and groundwater differently. States
regulate groundwater under a handful of legal doctrines.21 However, surface
water has a stark regional difference, with the eastern and western United
States following different doctrines.22 An overview of the laws regulating
surface and groundwater, as well as interstate disputes, is provided below.
A. Surface Water
In the United States, the East has traditionally been water rich, while
the West has been dry and arid.23 This difference in water availability has
resulted in two different legal regimes regulating surface water in the Eastern

18. DAVID W. MOODY ET AL., NAT’L WATER SUMMARY 1985: HYDROLOGIC EVENTS AND
SURFACE-WATER RESOURCES 300 (1986).
19. CATHERINE JANASIE & RACHEL BUDDRUS, NAT’L SEA GRANT LAW CTR., MISS.
RIVER VALLEY ALLUVIAL AQUIFER AND SPARTA AQUIFER COMPARISON REP. FOR THE STATES
OF MISS., TENN., AND MO.I 4 (2018).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 4–5.
22. Id.
23. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 4–5 (5th ed. 2015).
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and Western United States.24 In order to deal with water scarcity, western
states developed the prior appropriation doctrine.25 In the prior appropriation
system, the state issues water rights to users on a time-based priority basis,
thus earning the doctrine the popular name “first in time, first in right.”26
However, a water right does not guarantee the holder the ability to withdraw
water from a surface water source.27 If a surface water source does go dry
before it is a junior holder’s turn to draw water, he or she is out of luck, as
many surface water systems in the west are over appropriated.28
The legal regime in the Eastern United States is known as
riparianism.29 Traditionally, water rights belong to those who own property
along waterways—these property owners are known as riparians. Under the
common law, these riparians have a right to use the water abutting their
property as long as the use is reasonable and does not negatively affect the
rights of other riparians.30 This means, until there is a problem, there is very
little monitoring or control over how much water a riparian owner is using.31
However, as water resources in the Eastern United States have
become strained due to both water shortages and increased demand, some
states have adopted permit systems that require certain water withdrawals to
be permitted.32 These systems vary by state, but are generally referred to as
regulated riparianism.33 Over half of the riparian eastern states have adopted
some form of regulated riparianism, though the complexity of the permit
systems can range from simple to comprehensive.34
B. Groundwater
In most states, groundwater is regulated separately from surface
water.35 While in the past there were reasons for this difference in regulation,
such as a lack of understanding of the science related to groundwater, this is
no longer the case.36 However, many states continue to regulate surface water
and groundwater separately, despite the growing amount of evidence of
connecting some aquifers to surface water.37 Further, the nature of aquifers
24. Id.
25. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
26. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 23, at 71–72.
27. Id. at 105–06.
28. See Empire Lodge Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139 (Colo. 2011).
29. See Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 23, at 61.
35. Joseph W. Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 268
(2018).
36. Id.
37. Sharon B. Megdal et al., Groundwater Governance in the United States: A Mosaic
of Approaches, in ADVANCES IN GROUNDWATER 483, 490–91 (2018).
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themselves have led to the mistaken belief that these sources of water are
limitless.38 In reality, groundwater is replenished at extremely low rates.39
As a result of these physical characteristics of aquifers, laws and
regulations often allow overpumping. Due to overpumping, most aquifers are
being “mined,” a term of art that means more water is being pumped out of
the source than is being recharged.40 Aquifers are susceptible to mining
because, as discussed above, aquifer recharge happens at very low rates—
often inches per year—while pumping often depletes aquifers at feet per
year.41
States have developed varying common law groundwater doctrines,
including the rule of capture, American reasonable use, correlative rights,
and prior appropriation.42 These doctrines are not simply based on use rights.
Since groundwater pumping can have negative effects on your neighbors,
groundwater doctrines often also include rules of liability.43
The oldest groundwater common law doctrine is the rule of capture,
which allows a landowner to pump groundwater from his or her property.44
Also known as the absolute ownership doctrine, the rule also insulates a
landowner who withdraws groundwater from beneath the surface of his land
from any liability to neighboring landowners for the injuries that those
withdrawals cause, as long as the landowner is not pumping in a willful or
negligent way to cause harm.45 As the scientific understanding of
groundwater has increased, the rule of capture’s popularity has decreased.46
While the doctrine is still followed in several jurisdictions, such as Texas and
Maine, the doctrine can be modified in areas with critical groundwater levels.
For instance, the rule of capture does not apply to water withdrawals from
the Edwards Aquifer in Texas.47
The American reasonable use doctrine modifies the rule of capture
and started replacing the rule of capture in states in the early 20th century.48
The American reasonable use doctrine mostly mirrors the rule of capture, but
with the requirement that the groundwater be used on the overlying tract of
land for a reasonable use.49

38. Stephen Foster & John Chilton, Groundwater Management: Policy Principles and
Planning Practices, in ADVANCES IN GROUNDWATER 73, 77 (2018).
39. Id.
40. See Aquifer Mining, Oxford Reference, https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/
10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095420729.
41 . Stephen Foster & John Chilton, Groundwater Management: Policy Principles and
Planning Practices, in ADVANCES IN GROUNDWATER 73, 77 (2018).
42 . JANASIE & BUDDRUS, supra note 19, at 5–6.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999).
46. JANASIE & BUDDRUS, supra note 19, at 5–6.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Meeker v. City of East Orange, 74 A. 379 (N.J. 1909).
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Under the correlative rights doctrine, a person only has an
usufructuary interest in groundwater and not a proprietary interest.50 The
doctrine requires that water be shared based on both the water’s use and the
rights of other landowners in the area.51 Thus, being a landowner does not
necessarily give you a right to pump up water beneath your land.52
Finally, the prior appropriation doctrine for groundwater is very
similar to the surface water doctrine.53 As with surface water, the senior users
who first pumped the groundwater for a beneficial use gain priority over
junior users and have superior rights to use the water.54 Unlike with surface
water, however, where an entire river or stream can go dry, when a
groundwater well dries up there can still water left in the aquifer, meaning
that the water could be accessed by drilling a deeper well.55
C. Interstate Disputes
While state law governs most uses of water, when two or more states
disagree on how to share water resources between them, different rules apply.
Interstate water disputes can be resolved in several different ways. For
instance, Congress can settle the dispute through legislation, or states can
enter into compacts governing how to share water resources that cross state
borders, such as has been done by the states bordering the Great Lakes.56 In
2005, the Great Lake states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, with the consent of the U.S.
Congress, entered into a compact “[t]o act together to protect, conserve,
restore, improve and effectively manage” and “remove causes of present and
future controversies” in the Great Lakes Basin.57 But if states cannot reach
an agreement among themselves, the dispute must be resolved by the
Supreme Court of the United States.58
1. Original Jurisdiction
The Court has original jurisdiction in disputes between two or more
states.59 However, the Court does not automatically hear all interstate
disputes—instead the Court requires a complaining state to file a motion
asking the Court for leave to file a complaint.60 Once this initial motion is
50 .
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

JANASIE & BUDDRUS, supra note 19, at 5–6.
See Woodsum v. Pemberton Twp., 412 A.2d 1064 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
Id.
JANASIE & BUDDRUS, supra note 19, at 5–6.
Id.; see also Farmers Inv. Co. v. Bettwy, 558 P.2d 14, 19 (Ariz. 1976).
Id.
See Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact (2005).
Id. § 4.3
U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
Id.
SUP. CT. R. 17.
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filed, the named parties file briefs on whether or not the Court should hear
the case.61
Because the Court is primarily an appellate court, it has decided to
exercise its “original jurisdiction ‘sparingly’ and retains ‘substantial
discretion’ to decide whether a particular claim requires ‘an original forum
in this court.’”62 A study looking at original jurisdiction cases brought before
the Court found that from 1961–1993, the Court only granted leave to file a
complaint in about half of the cases seeking the Court’s original
jurisdiction.63 However, during the same time period, the Court received a
total of 16 cases concerning the rights to interstate waters and only declined
to hear two.64
Unlike in cases that come before the Court on appeal, in cases
between states, the Supreme Court serves as the trial court. Since the early
20th century, in original jurisdiction cases the Court has appointed a “special
master” to run a trial-like process for each case.65 The special master is bound
by the Court’s rules governing original jurisdiction cases.66 These rules
specify that the Federal Rules of Procedure apply to motions and pleadings
in the case, but are only guidance for all other aspects of the case.67 Likewise,
the Federal Rules of Evidence are only guidance and not binding in
proceedings before the special master.
Besides the Court’s rules, the special master is also bound by
whatever directions the Court makes when appointing the master.68 For
example, in the Mississippi v. Tennessee case, the Court directed the special
master “to fix the time and conditions for the filing of additional pleadings,
to direct subsequent proceedings, to summon witnesses, to issue subpoenas,
and to take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem it
necessary to call for.”69 Thus, the special master has a great deal of discretion
in how to run the trial-like procedure.
At the end of the trial-like process, the special master will prepare a
report to deliver to the Court.70 The Court will then decide whether to accept
the master’s findings and recommendations in whole or in part.71 While the
61. Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court’s
Management of its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. REV. 185, 188 (1993)
62. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 267 (2010) (quoting Mississippi v.
Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 76 (1992)).
63. McKusick, supra note 61, at 189.
64. Id. at 202.
65. Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special
Masters in the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 644
(2002).
66. SUP. CT. R. 17.
67. Id.
68. Carstens, supra note 65, at 653–54.
69. Mississippi v. Tennessee, No. 143 Original, Order Appointing Special Master, Nov.
10, 2015, https://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/special-master [https://perma.cc/U2Z4-EFFF].
70. Carstens, supra note 65, at 655–56.
71. Id.
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Court is known for giving deference to special masters, there are times when
the Court will send the case back to the special master to make further
findings.72
2. Equitable Apportionment
The Supreme Court created the common law doctrine of equitable
apportionment to resolve disputes over the use of interstate waters in a 1907
case, Kansas v. Colorado.73 When equitably apportioning water, the Court
determines the rights of each state to use an interstate water.74 Over the years,
the Court has established some general rules for equitable apportionment.
When determining how to apportion water between states, the Court
will consider the laws of the individual states, but has ruled that those laws
are not binding.75 Further, in trying to reach an equitable result, the Court will
not engage in “quibbling over formulas.”76 With equitable apportionment,
each state is entitled to “equality of right.”77 The Court has stated that this
does not necessarily amount “to an equal division of water, but to the equal
level or plane on which all the states stand, in point of power and right, under
our constitutional system.”78
The Court has stated that equitable apportionment is a flexible
doctrine, and it will consider all relevant factors of the case.79 In previous
cases, the Court has given factors that will inform its decision, which include:
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of
water in the several sections of the river, the character and
rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the
availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful
uses on downstream areas, [and] the damage to upstream
areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a
limitation is imposed on the former.80
The circumstances of certain equitable apportionment cases have
also led the Court to consider some additional factors. In Colorado v. New
72. See Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502 (2018) (rejecting the special master’s
recommendation to dismiss the complaint and remanding the case back to the special master
to make further findings).
73. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
74. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183-84 (1982).
75. Id.
76. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931).
77. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465 (1922).
78. Id.
79. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. at 183 (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S.
589, 618 (1945)).
80. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2515 (2018) (quoting citing Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945)).
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Mexico, the Court declared that in equitable apportionment cases, “wasteful
or inefficient uses [of water] will not be protected.”81 In that case, the Court
further declared that it has “invoked equitable apportionment not only to
require the reasonably efficient use of water, but also to impose on states an
affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to conserve and augment the water
supply of an interstate stream.”82
Since the Court has never apportioned a case involving only
groundwater, it developed these factors to address the characteristics of
surface water. Thus, it is hard to predict how the Court would apply its
equitable apportionment decisions to a case solely involving groundwater. At
this time, however, this is still a hypothetical discussion. This is because, as
discussed below, Mississippi is not seeking equitable apportionment in the
Mississippi v. Tennessee case.
II. WATER LAW IN MISSISSIPPI AND TENNESSEE
Since water law is mostly a creature of state law and Mississippi is
not seeking equitable apportionment, it is important to examine how both
Mississippi and Tennessee regulate water use within their borders. An
overview of the laws and regulations in regards to the use of freshwater
resources for each state is provided below, as well as a short discussion of
the major uses of freshwater in Mississippi and Tennessee.
A. Water Law in Mississippi
Through statute, Mississippi has outlined the state’s interest in
waters within its borders. Mississippi law states that:
All water, whether occurring on the surface of the ground or
underneath the surface of the ground, is hereby declared to
be among the basic resources of this state to therefore belong
to the people of this state and is subject to regulation in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. The control
and development and use of water for all beneficial purposes
shall be in the state, which, in the exercise of its police
powers, shall take such measures to effectively and
efficiently manage, protect and utilize the water resources of
Mississippi.83

81. Colorado v. Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 184 (1982).
82. Id.
83. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 51-3-1 (2019) (“No person who is not specifically exempted by
this chapter shall use water without having first obtained a permit as provided herein and
without having otherwise complied with the provisions of this chapter, the regulations
promulgated hereunder and any applicable permit conditions.”).
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Mississippi is a regulated riparian state.84 Those wishing to use either
surface water or groundwater in the state must first obtain a permit from the
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) Permit Board.85
Mississippi law provides a couple of exemptions to this requirement. First, a
person does not need to obtain a permit for purely domestic purposes.86 In
addition, those pumping water from a well less than six inches in diameter
also do not need a permit.87
The MDEQ and its Office of Land and Water Resources (OLWR)
has ranked the beneficial uses for groundwater from those uses with the
highest priority to the lowest priority.88 OLWR has designated public water
supply, industrial, and commercial uses as the highest priority uses of
groundwater.89 OLWR delineates industrial and commercial uses into more
specific categories, including agriculture, industrial, livestock, and
commercial.90
The OLWR also lists several limitations on uses of water for both
surface and groundwater.91 The limitations for surface water are based on the
established minimum flow for a given watercourse.92 The MDEQ Permit
Board may limit municipal users and industrial users if a water use will
negatively affect an established minimum flow.93 The limitations for
groundwater are situation specific.94 For example, MDEQ does not consider
the use of a large amount of water for a once-through, non-contact cooling
purpose as a beneficial use.95 Thus, under the regulations one is prohibited
from using an amount of water in excess of 20,000 gallons per day.96
As a state, Mississippi is highly dependent on groundwater, as it
draws only 427 million gallons per day (mgd) of surface water as compared
to 2,240 mgd of groundwater.97 The main uses for fresh surface water include
irrigation (130 mgd), industrial (109 mgd), thermoelectric power (84 mgd),
public supply (53.4 mgd), and aquaculture (39.3 mgd).98 For groundwater,
the main uses are irrigation (1,640 mgd), public supply (347 mgd),
84 . DON R. CHRISTY ET AL, A COMPARISON OF SURFACE WATER LAWS AND
REGULATIONS FROM SOUTHEASTERN STATES (2005), https://athenaeum.libs.uga.edu/bitstream/
handle/10724/19397/surfacewater.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/C6S4-JAQA].
85. MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-5(1) (2019).
86. Id. § 51-3-7.
87. Id.
88. 11 Miss. Admin. Code R. Pt. 7, R. 1.4 (West, Westlaw current through Oct. 2019).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. JANASIE & BUDDRUS, supra note 19, at 8.
92. 11 Miss. Admin. Code R. Pt. 7, R. 1.3 (West, Westlaw current through Oct. 2019).
93. Id.
94. Id. R. 1.4.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2015
14–16 (2018).
98. Id. at 14.
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aquaculture (87.5 mgd), industrial (72.8 mgd), and private domestic supply
wells (48.1 mgd).99
With Mississippi, it is important to note that groundwater
withdrawals are coming from two different aquifers. The Mississippi River
Valley Alluvial Aquifer (MRVA) is located in multiple states, and the
majority of the aquifer is located beneath Arkansas, Mississippi, and
Tennessee.100 The majority of groundwater permits in Mississippi, around
80%, are drawing from the MRVA, and these permits are managed by the
Yazoo Mississippi Delta Joint Water Management District (YMD).101 The
state created the YMD to manage diminishing water levels in the MRVA,
which the state’s agricultural sector relies heavily on.102 The Sparta aquifer
extends from south Texas through Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee,
Mississippi, and into Alabama.103 The Sparta aquifer is the aquifer in dispute
in the Mississippi v. Tennessee lawsuit and is relied upon by north Mississippi
and Shelby County, Tennessee for drinking water.104
B. Water Law in Tennessee
Tennessee, unlike Mississippi, does not have a single overarching
statute governing water resources in the state. Like Mississippi, however, the
state of Tennessee has made broad property declarations towards water
through its water quality and drinking water statutes.105 In its drinking water
law, the state declares that “the waters of the state are the property of the state
and are held in public trust for the benefit of its citizens,” and “the people of
the state are beneficiaries of this trust and have a right to both an adequate
quantity and quality of drinking water.”106
99. Id. at 16.
100. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MISS. RIVER VALLEY ALLUVIAL AQUIFER, ALA., ARK.,
ILL., KY., LA., MISS., TENN.; 2006–2008, https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/mississippi-rivervalley-alluvial-aquifer-alabama-arkansas-illinois-kentucky-louisian-2006-2008 (last updated
Jan. 29, 2020) [https://perma.cc/T9DG-WBS2].
101. Permitting, YAZOO MISS. DELTA JOINT WATER MGMT. DIST., https://ymdstoneville.
squarespace.com/permitting [https://perma.cc/4XVZ-JTGN].
102. History, YAZOO MISS. DELTA JOINT WATER MGMT. DIST., https://ymdstoneville.
squarespace.com/history [https://perma.cc/47T8-JSYD].
103. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., THE SPARTA AQUIFER: A SUSTAINABLE WATER RESOURCE,
https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-111-02/ [https://perma.cc/49LV-994K].
104. State of Mississippi’s Mot. for Leave to File Bill of Compl. in Original Action,
Compl., and Br. in Supp. of Mot., at 5–6.
105. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-221-702 (2019).
106. Id. The state has made a similar statement in its Water Quality Control Act:
“Recognizing that the waters of Tennessee are the property of the state and are held in public
trust for the use of the people of the state, it is declared to be the public policy of Tennessee
that the people of Tennessee, as beneficiaries of this trust, have a right to unpolluted waters.
In the exercise of its public trust over the waters of the state, the government of Tennessee has
an obligation to take all prudent steps to secure, protect, and preserve this right.” Id. § 69-3102(a). Section 68-221-702 also creates a planning obligation on behalf of the state:
“Recognizing that the waters of the state are the property of the state and are held in public
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Tennessee regulates surface water in the state under the riparian
doctrine.107 Courts in the state have determined that riparian owners can use
the steam in a reasonable manner as it flows past their property.108 Like other
riparian states, the right of the riparian is only usufruct—the landowner can
use the water, but does not own the water itself.109 Similarly, the riparian’s
right is equal to all other riparians, and his or her use cannot negatively affect
the use of another riparian.110 The Tennessee courts have also given priority
to domestic uses, while stating that other uses such as irrigation or industrial
are allowed as long as another riparian’s domestic use is not impaired.111
Groundwater law in Tennessee is not as well established, as there are
few cases on the subject.112 The leading case in the state speaks to both
reasonable use and correlative rights.113 In referring to the reasonable use
rule, the court cites cases from other states like New Hampshire and Florida
that also mention correlative rights.114 For instance, the quoted language from
Florida states, “[t]he property rights relative to the passage of waters that
naturally percolate through the land of one owner to and through the land of
another owner are correlative; and each landowner is restricted to a
reasonable use of his property as it affects subsurface waters passing to or
from the land of another.”115
Tennessee does have some aspects of regulated riparianism, but not
to the extent of other states like Mississippi. Through the Tennessee Water
Resources Information Act, the Inter-Basin Transfer Act, and the Water
Quality Control Act, the state regulates withdrawals from surface and
groundwater to a certain extent.116 Tennessee created the Water Resources
Information Act (“Information Act”) to “institute a system of registration so
that adequate information is obtained to document current demand for water
and to project growth in that demand . . . .”117 The Information Act requires
anyone withdrawing more than 10,000 gallons or more of surface or
groundwater per day must register with the commissioner of the Tennessee

trust for the benefit of its citizens, it is declared that the people of the state are beneficiaries of
this trust and have a right to both an adequate quantity and quality of drinking water.” Id. §
68-221-702.
107. 25 TENN. JURIS. WATER AND WATERCOURSES § 11; see also Hurley v. Am. Enka
Corp., 93 F .Supp. 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1950).
108. Cox v. Howell, 65 S.W. 868, 868–69 (Tenn. 1901).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 869.
111. Id.
112. See LEGAL & INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK WORKING GRP., TENN. H20, TENNESSEE’S
ROADMAP TO SECURING THE FUTURE OF OUR WATER RESOURCES 9 (2018).
113. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Rickert, 89 S.W.2d 889, 896–97 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1935).
114. Id. at 897.
115. Id. (quoting Cason v. Florida Power Co., 74 Fla. 1, 7 (1917).
116. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 69-7-201 to -204 (2019).
117. Id. § 69-7-302.
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Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC).118 However, there
are certain exceptions to the registration requirement, such as withdrawals
for agricultural purposes.119
The Inter-Basin Transfer Act (“IBT Act”) mostly regulates surface
water use in Tennessee, but also covers groundwater in particular
circumstances.120 The IBT Act requires TDEC to permit certain transfers
between water basins.121 The IBT Act only applies to certain persons or
entities in the state: those “that have been granted powers by the state to
acquire water, water rights and associated property by eminent domain or
condemnation” and those “that acquire or supply water for the use or benefit
of public water supply.”122 These entities who intend to increase their use or
plan on introducing a new use must obtain a permit from TDEC.123 While the
IBT Act primarily applies to surface water, the permitting requirements can
also apply to groundwater.124 If a groundwater withdrawal “has a significant
potential to adversely affect the flow of a Tennessee surface water,” the IBT
Act applies to the withdrawal.125
Finally, TDEC regulates certain water diversions in the state through
the Aquatic Resource Alteration Permit (ARAP) program.126 Water
withdrawals that would alter “the physical, chemical, radiological,
biological, or bacteriological properties of any waters of the state” require an
ARAP.127 Thus, groundwater withdrawals that alter surface waters may
require an ARAP.128 Exemptions do exist for the ARAP program,
however.129 For instance, as discussed above with the Information Act,
agricultural operations are exempt from the ARAP program.130
The majority of water used in Tennessee is surface water.131 As of
2015, Tennessee used 5,990 mgd of surface water and only 430 mgd of
groundwater.132 The primary use for surface water in the state is
thermoelectric (4,620 mgd) followed by industrial (682 mgd), public supply
118. Id. §§ 69-7-303 to -304.
119. Id. § 69-7-304.
120. Id. § 69-7-201.
121. Id. §§ 69-7-201 to -202. Under the IBT Act, “basins” are major Tennessee rivers
and their tributaries, including the Mississippi River. Id. § 69-7-203.
122. Id. § 69-7-204(a).
123. Id.
124. JANASIE & BUDDRUS, supra note 19, at 11–12.
125. Id; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-7-204 (2019).
126. TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-3-108 (2019); Aquatic Resource Alteration Permit (ARAP),
TENN. DEP’T OF ENV’T & CONSERVATION, https://www.tn.gov/environment/permit-permits/
water-permits1/aquatic-resource-alteration-permit--arap-.html [https://perma.cc/R73M54DN].
127. TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-3-108(b)(1) (2019).
128. JANASIE & BUDDRUS, supra note 19, at 11–12.
129. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0400-40-07-.02.
130. TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-3-120(g).
131. CHARLES E. BOHAC & AMANDA K. BOWEN, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., WATER USE IN
THE TENNESSEE VALLEY FOR 2010 AND PROJECTED USE IN 2035 (2012).
132. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., supra note 97, at 9.
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(594 mgd), aquaculture (45.2 mgd), and irrigation (27.4 mgd).133 While
thermoelectric power is the largest user of surface water, it is also the largest
source of return flow in the state.134
The majority of groundwater is used for public water supply (256
mgd), followed by industrial (51.6 mgd), domestic use (42.8 mgd), irrigation
(36.4 mgd), and thermoelectric (2.18 mgd).135 The uses of groundwater in
West Tennessee, where the MRVA and Sparta aquifers are located, include
public water supply, industrial, and agriculture.136 In particular, Memphis and
surrounding Shelby County rely primarily on groundwater for its drinking
water supplies.137
III. MISSISSIPPI V. TENNESSEE
Currently, Mississippi and Tennessee are in a dispute concerning
groundwater from the Memphis Sands Aquifer, which is fed mostly by the
Sparta Sands Aquifer and underlies several states including Mississippi and
Tennessee.138 Mississippi and Tennessee both pump water from this
aquifer.139 The City of Memphis pumps its water very close to the
Mississippi-Tennessee border.140 Mississippi has challenged this use before
by suing the City of Memphis for monetary damages.141 In 2009, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Mississippi’s lawsuit, ruling that
Mississippi had framed its case incorrectly.142 The court determined that the
aquifer was an interstate resource, so Tennessee, which was not named in the
suit, was a necessary party.143 Further, the court ruled that since it was an
interstate dispute between the states of Mississippi and Tennessee, original
and exclusive jurisdiction belonged to the Supreme Court of the United
States.144
In 2015, Mississippi motioned the Court for leave to file a suit
against Tennessee, the City of Memphis and the Memphis Light, Gas, and

133. Id. at 14.
134. BOHAC & BOWEN, supra note 131.
135. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., supra note 97, at 16.
136. JANASIE & BUDDRUS, supra note 19, at 12.
137. Tom Charlier, The Memphis Sand Aquifer: A Buried Treasure, COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (Dec. 16, 2016, 12:03 PM), https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/
environment/2016/12/16/memphis-sand-aquifer-buried-treasure/93814278/ [https://perma.
cc/NL37-BF3V].
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.; see also Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 633 (5th
Cir. 2009).
143. JANASIE & BUDDRUS, supra note 19, at 6–7.
144. Id.
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Water Division, regarding the use of the aquifer, and the Supreme Court
granted the motion.145
A. Mississippi v. Tennessee Overview
In the current lawsuit, Mississippi is concerned with Memphis
pumping groundwater close to the border between the two states.146 When
someone pumps large amounts of groundwater, it creates what is known as a
cone of depression.147 The pumping changes the flow of water, causing more
water to flow your way and lowering the water table of your neighbor,
forcing them to need a deeper well.148
The states of Mississippi and Tennessee have very different theories
for the case.149 Tennessee, referring to the previous Fifth Circuit decision, is
claiming the water is an interstate resource, and thus, the Court needs to
determine how much each state is entitled to.150 Mississippi claims that
Memphis’s pumping has taken billions of gallons of water out of
Mississippi—water that is “owned” by Mississippi.151 Like its previous
lawsuit, Mississippi is treating the water in the aquifer as Mississippi
property, not as an interstate resource. Instead of equitable apportionment,
the state is seeking monetary damages of not less than $615 million for the
water Tennessee has taken.152
The Court has appointed the Hon. Eugene E. Siler of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit as the special master for the case.153 After
considering each state’s initial filings in the case, the Special Master issued
a Memorandum of Decision in August 2016 that ordered an initial hearing
on whether the aquifer was an interstate resource.154 In the Memorandum, the
Special Master noted that he did not think that Mississippi had made its case
in its initial pleadings.155 The Special Master made a similar statement in its
2018 opinion denying Tennessee’s motion for summary judgment.156
145. Id.
146. Janasie, supra note 7.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.; see also Br. of Def. State of Tennessee in Opp’n to State of Mississippi’s Mot.
for Leave to File Bill of Compl. in Original Action at 22–24, Mississippi v. Tennessee, No.
15–143 (U.S. Sept. 14, 2015).
151. Id.
152. JANASIE & BUDDRUS, supra note 19, at 6–7; see also State of Mississippi’s Mot. for
Leave to File Bill of Compl. in Original Action, Compl., and Br. in Supp. of Mot., supra
note 95, at 14.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Mem. of Decision on Tennessee’s Mot. to Dismiss, Memphis and Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Division’s Mot. to Dismiss, and Mississippi’s Mot. to Exclude, Mississippi v.
Tennessee, No. 55-143 (U.S. Aug. 12, 2016).
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Since that time, the parties have participated in an initial hearing on
the specific question the Special Master highlighted in his 2016
Memorandum of Decision—“whether the water that is at issue in this case is
interstate in nature.”157 Relying on this language, Mississippi has been trying
to make the case in its response that, even though they are part of a larger
aquifer, the Sparta Sand and Memphis Sand are separate aquifers and
geologic formations, thus making the groundwater in Mississippi intrastate
in nature.158 At the time of writing, the Special Master has not released his
ruling on this initial hearing.
B. The Flaws in Mississippi’s Case
Mississippi has several flaws in its argument. The first flaw is its
claim that it owns the groundwater within the state. Secondly, it relies on the
proposition that surface water and groundwater are treated differently under
the law. However, it should be noted that these claims are intertwined, as
Mississippi relies on surface water theories to bolster its ownership claims.
1. Sovereign Ownership
In its filings, Mississippi has continually stated that it owns the
groundwater within the state’s borders. Starting with its Motion for Leave to
File Bill of Complaint in 2014, Mississippi has claimed a sovereign interest
to all natural resources, including groundwater, within its borders.159 As
Professors Hall and Regalia160 and Professor Klein161 note in their papers on
the Mississippi v. Tennessee dispute, states do not “own” the natural
resources within their states, including groundwater.
2. Surface and Groundwater Are Different
In its filings, Mississippi continually makes the claim that
groundwater is different from surface water, and thus, should not be subject
to equitable apportionment. In making these claims, the state relies on
physical and geological characteristics of groundwater. However, the state
does not assert that the law for surface water and groundwater has evolved
separately, likely because Mississippi treats surface and groundwater
similarly, regulating both through a permit system.
157. Janasie, supra note 7.
158. Id.
159. State of Mississippi’s Mot. for Leave to File Bill of Compl. in Original Action,
Compl., and Br. in Supp. of Mot., supra note 104, at 3–5.
160. Noah D. Hall & Joseph Regalia, Interstate Groundwater Revisited: Mississippi v.
Tennessee, 34 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 152, 203 (2016).
161. Christine A. Klein, Owning Groundwater: The Example of Mississippi v. Tennessee,
35 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 474 (2017).
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IV. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: RELYING ON SURFACE WATER
DOCTRINES TO MAKE OWNERSHIP CLAIMS
Mississippi asserts its ownership claims based on multiple legal
doctrines. First, the state relies on the United States Constitution, citing the
Tenth Amendment for the proposition that it “is sovereign over all matters
not ceded to the federal government.”162 Next, the state relies on the equal
footing doctrine to make the claim that, when it became the twentieth state
to the Union in 1817, it entered “on an equal footing with the original thirteen
colonies and, thereupon, became vested with ownership, control, and
dominion over the lands and waters within its territorial boundaries.”163
Finally, Mississippi relies on the public trust doctrine to assert ownership and
control over the groundwater within the state, which it provides as the legal
basis for the state’s law asserting regulatory control over groundwater.164
There is a flaw in Mississippi citing the equal footing doctrine and
the public trust doctrine, though, as both doctrines have traditionally been
applied only to navigable waters and the submerged lands beneath those
waters, not to groundwater. Further, while some states such as California and
New Jersey have expanded the public trust doctrine beyond its historic scope,
Mississippi does not assert that the state has done so and fails to argue why
the doctrine should apply to the state’s groundwater supply. Rather, it relies
on inapplicable cases to make its claims.
A. What Are Navigable Waters?
Navigable waters could be one of the most confusing terms in legal
scholarship. A basis for this confusion is that there are multiple tests for
determining whether a water is navigable depending on the circumstances of
each case, including tests for admiralty jurisdiction, federal regulatory
authority, and to determine state title for purposes of the public trust and
equal footing doctrines. For the purposes of Mississippi’s case, we are
focused on the last test, but it is helpful to note how the state title test differs
from the other two.
For admiralty jurisdiction, the term navigable waters applies to both
traditionally navigable waters, as well as waters that have been made
navigable, such as artificial canals.165 The test for federal regulatory authority
has gotten the most attention in environmental law thanks to the Clean Water
Act’s definition of navigable waters: Waters of the United States.166 For that
162. State of Mississippi’s Post-Hearing Br. at 9, Mississippi v. Tennessee, No. 117-143
(U.S. Sept. 19, 2019).
163. Id.
164. State of Mississippi’s Mot. for Leave to File Bill of Compl. in Original Action,
Compl., and Br. in Supp. of Mot., supra note 104, at 3–5 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 51-3-1).
165. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 592 (2012) (citing Ex parte Boyer,
109 U.S. 629, 631–32 (1884)).
166. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 730 (2006) (plurality opinion).
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test, the navigable waters must have a connection to interstate commerce,
meaning that the term navigable waters can be applied to waters that are more
than truly navigable.167 Thus, wetlands connected to a navigable water can
be covered by federal regulatory authority.168
However, the test for navigability for title is different, and implicates
the public trust doctrine and the equal footing doctrine. To determine
navigability for state title purposes, the body of water in question must have
been navigable at the time of statehood, in its natural, ordinary condition.169
For state title purposes, navigability is a matter of federal, and not state,
law.170 Further, the waterway must be navigable in fact, or in other words,
truly navigable.171
What can be confusing is that all three of these tests have evolved
from a test first articulated in an 1871 case known as The Daniel Ball.172 The
case concerned the authority of the federal government to regulate navigation
on a river, and laid out a test for determining whether a water was navigable
in fact, stating that:
The test by which to determine the navigability of our rivers
is found in their navigable capacity. Those rivers are public
navigable rivers in law which are navigable in
fact. . . . Rivers are navigable in fact when they are used, or
are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or
may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water.173
While The Daniel Ball involved federal authority to regulate
navigation on a river, the test articulated in the case has been extended to
other types of waterways174 and to determine navigability for state title
purposes.175 Relying on The Daniel Ball, courts have found that, for purposes
of the public trust and equal footing doctrines, the water in question must
have been used, or was capable of being used, for commerce using customary
modes of travel at the time of statehood.176 Further, the waterway must be
capable of commerce in its ordinary condition.177
167. PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 592–93.
168. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 730–31 (plurality opinion).
169. PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 592.
170. Id. at 591.
171. Id. at 592.
172. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1871).
173. Id. at 557.
174. See United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935) (determining the navigability of
lakes).
175. See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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Thus, the waterway does not have to be interstate in nature.178 Nor
must it have been a “highway for commerce” at that time of statehood.179 Nor
does it matter what type of vessel was used or could have been used for
navigation or if that waterway at times could not support navigation. As the
Court has stated:
navigability does not depend on the particular mode in
which such use is or may be had-whether by steamboats,
sailing vessels or flatboats-nor on an absence of occasional
difficulties in navigation, but on the fact, if it be a fact, that
the stream in its natural and ordinary condition affords a
channel for useful commerce.180
For instance, the Court has found that Great Salt Lake was property
of the State of Utah under the equal footing doctrine, even though the lake is
completely within the state’s boundaries and had only been used by a handful
of people, including ranch owners to move cattle by boat and a short-lived
passenger ferry in the 1880s.181 The Court made this finding, even though
lake levels had dropped greatly by the time of statehood in 1896, because the
lake was still able to support navigation at that time.182
B. The Public Trust and Equal Footing Doctrines
The public trust doctrine and the equal footing doctrine are
intertwined. The public trust doctrine has a firm basis in Roman and English
common law, and these legal regimes recognized water and its associated
tidelands as an important common resource.183 The courts in the United
States decided to follow the English common law, establishing that states
hold the title to the tidelands and submerged lands below navigable waters in
trust for the benefit of the residents of the state.184
The seminal United States Supreme Court case on the public trust
doctrine is Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.185 In the case, the Court
outlined the contours of the public trust doctrine and differentiated it from
other property interests, stating that “the state holds title to the lands under
the navigable waters” of the state “in trust for the people of the state” for the

178. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971).
179. Id.
180. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926) (emphasis added)
(determining the navigability of Mud Lake in Minnesota for title purposes).
181. See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 12.
182. Id. at 11–12.
183. Catherine Janasie, Groundwater in California—Does the Public Trust Doctrine
Apply?, THE SANDBAR, Oct. 2018, at 14.
184. Id.; see also Phillip Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 482 (1988).
185. Janasie, supra note 183; see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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purposes of navigation, commerce, and fishing.186 The Court also prohibited
the transfer of trust property unless it benefits the trust, such as through
building wharves and docks.187
Thus, all states must manage their public trust resources to these
standards.188 However, states can extend the public trust to more lands or
more uses within their state.189 In PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, a case
examining the contours of the equal footing doctrine, the Court noted in dicta
the ability of states to define the terms of the public trust doctrine within the
state, stating that “[s]tates retain residual power to determine the scope of the
public trust over waters within their borders.”190 Thus, the public trust
doctrine is a mix of federal and state law. At a minimum, states must ensure
their trusts meet the standards of Illinois Central, while maintaining the
ability to expand the terms of the trust beyond those minimum standards.
In fact, many state courts have noted that the trust is not static and
should evolve to accommodate changing conditions and the public’s needs.
For instance, New Jersey has expanded its trust to allow recreation and other
shore activities, and even allows its residents to access and use privatelyowned, dry sand beaches as needed to access the ocean.191 Similarly, in the
famous “Mono Lake” case, the Supreme Court of California determined that
the public trust required ecological effects to be considered when allocating
water resources.192 Further, the court ruled that the doctrine requires
consideration of diversions from non-navigable tributaries if those diversions
will affect public trust resources.193
Unlike the public trust doctrine, which can be viewed as a mix of
federal and state law, the equal footing doctrine is solely based on federal
law. The equal footing doctrine seeks to put subsequent states on “equal
footing” with the original thirteen colonies who took title to the navigable
waters and the related submerged in trust lands under the public trust
doctrine.194 The Supreme Court of the United States spoke on the equal
footing doctrine in Pollard v. Hagan, noting that “[t]he shores
of navigable waters, and the soils under them, were not granted by the
Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the states
respectively . . . the new states have the same rights, sovereignty, and
jurisdiction over this subject as the original states.”195
The navigable waters covered by the equal footing doctrine, as
discussed above, are determined by the state title test developed under The
186. Janasie, supra note 183; see also Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452.
187. Janasie, supra note 183.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603–04 (2012).
191. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
192. Janasie, supra note 183.
193. Id.; see also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
194. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 196 (1987).
195. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230 (1845).
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Daniel Ball.196 Notably, the test looks at whether the water in question was
used or capable of being used for commerce using customary modes of travel
at the time of statehood.197
Finally, it should be noted that the public trust and equal footing
doctrines encompass waters subject to the tides, as was decided by the Court
in Phillips Petroleum, discussed more fully below. As will also be more fully
discussed below, while there have been attempts to expand the equal footing
doctrine beyond navigable waters and the submerged lands below them,
these attempts have failed.
C. Equal Footing Doctrine Has Not Been Extended Beyond Navigable
Waters and Submerged Lands
While there have been attempts to apply the equal footing doctrine
to more than just navigable waters and submerged lands, the courts have
refused to make this extension. In Scott v. Lattig, the Court refused to apply
the equal footing doctrine to an island in the middle of the Snake River, and
stated that, upon entering the Union, each new state “becomes endowed with
the same rights and powers . . . as the older” states by the fact “that lands
underlying navigable waters within the several states belong to the respective
state in virtue of their sovereignty.”198 Therefore, the ownership of an island
that was dry land when Idaho became a state did not pass to the state upon
statehood, as it “was not part of the bed of the stream or land under the
water.”199
The Court made a similar ruling in 1973 in Louisiana v. Texas in
stating that “[i]t is the unquestioned rule that States entering the Union
acquire title to the lands under navigable streams and other navigable waters
within their borders.”200 Further, “the rule does not reach islands or fast lands
located within such waters.”201 Thus, it would be a change of course for the
Court to suddenly find that the equal footing doctrine applies to groundwater
after stating unequivocally that the doctrine is limited to navigable waters
and the related submerged lands.
However, the Special Master in this case has noted “[t]hat no
previous case has recognized an equal-footing claim in the context of a
dispute over the depletion of interstate water, does not, in itself, mean that
such a claim is necessarily invalid.”202 That said, in early opinions in this
case, the Special Master has found fault with Mississippi’s equal footing
196. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 557 (1871).
197. Id.
198. Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1913).
199. Id.
200. Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702, 713 (1973).
201. Id.
202. Mem. of Decision on Tennessee’s Mot. to Dismiss, Memphis and Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Division’s Mot. to Dismiss, and Mississippi’s Mot. to Exclude, supra note 156,
at 24.
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doctrine claim. In his opinion rejecting Tennessee’s motion for summary
judgment, the Special Master noted Mississippi’s equal footing argument
“sailed wide of its target.”203 In an earlier 2016 opinion on Tennessee’s
motion to dismiss, the Special Master wrote that “Mississippi’s discussion of
equal footing does not appear to show that the doctrine applies to disputes
concerning a State’s pumping from an interstate resource.”204
There is fault though in the Special Master’s analysis, as it focuses
on the interstate nature of the aquifer. In this way, the Special Master’s
statements miss the point. As stated above, the equal footing doctrine does
not apply to groundwater. It does not even apply to all surface water within
a state. The doctrine only applies to navigable waters that were navigable at
the time of statehood, and the submerged lands under them. Based on these
contours of the equal footing doctrine, the Special Master could have wholeheartedly rejected Mississippi’s claims.
D. The Public Trust Doctrine: Does It Apply to Groundwater?
The application of the public trust doctrine to groundwater is not
settled law. In fact, in making its public trust arguments, Mississippi relies
on a string of cases that deal with surface water. While Mississippi is correct
in noting that state law controls the “ownership and allocation of the use of
natural resources located within its borders,” it has no case to rely upon to
show that the public trust doctrine has been extended to groundwater in
Mississippi.205
In its briefs, Mississippi asserts that a Mississippi case determining
the scope of the state’s public trust, which was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, grants
the state “ownership and plenary authority over its water resources.”206
Mississippi also contends that the Cinque Bambini case recognized that
“once Mississippi had been admitted to the Union and the public trust had
been created and funded, the role of the equal footing doctrine ended and the
title to and plenary authority over the lands and resources conveyed in the
trust became vested in the state.”207
There are two problems with Mississippi’s arguments. The first is
that Cinque Bambini had nothing to do with groundwater, so much so that
the term “groundwater” is not mentioned once in the opinion. Second,
Mississippi is relying on a state’s ability to define the boundaries of the public
trust doctrine within its borders. The problem is, however, that the state’s
203. Mem. of Decision on Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., at 21, Memphis v. Tennessee, No.
143 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2018).
204. Mem. of Decision on Tennessee’s Mot. to Dismiss, Memphis and Memphis Light,
Gas, & Water, Division’s Mot. to Dismiss, and Mississippi’s Mot. to Exclude, supra note 156,
at 21.
205. State of Mississippi’s Post-Hearing Br., supra note 162, at 10.
206. Id. at 9.
207. Id. at 10.
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Supreme Court has not found the public trust includes groundwater, even
when it has had the chance.
1. Reliance on Surface Water Cases
The subject matter of the Cinque Bambini case was whether the
navigable waters test under the equal footing doctrine replaced the traditional
test under English common law that the public trust included waters subject
to tidal influence.208 In accordance with other cases on the matter, the court
noted that “the question of what lands were given to the State in trust is
necessarily a question of federal law.”209
The court started its analysis by stating that “the identity of properties
granted by the United States in trust became fixed at the time of statehood.”210
In deciding whether the trust included non-navigable waters subject to tidal
influences, the court noted that, traditionally, “tidewaters” were the subject
of the public trust, and that the public trust had evolved in the United States
to include non-tidal freshwaters in non-coastal, inland states.211 In
determining whether the navigable waters test meant that tidally-influenced,
non-navigable waters were not included in the trust, the court found that the
public trust doctrine included both waters that meet the navigable waters
tests, as well non-navigable, tidally-influenced waters.212
In its post-hearing brief, Mississippi relies on a quote from this part
of the Cinque Bambini opinion, claiming, “[t]he Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed the State’s ownership and plenary authority over its water resources,
including subterranean resources.”213 In reality, the opinion makes reference
to “subsurface” resources only once, and was referencing the right of the state
to resources found below tidal watercourses. The full quote states:
In summary, effective upon statehood on March 1, 1817, we
understand federal law to provide that the United States
granted to the State of Mississippi in trust all lands, to which
the United States then held title, including their mineral and
other subsurface resources, subject to the ebb and flow of
the tide below the then mean high water level—regardless of
whether the water courses were commercially navigable at
the time of Mississippi’s admission into the Union,
regardless of how insignificant the tidal influence, or how
shallow the water, regardless of how far inland and remote
208. Cinque Bambini P’ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 513–14 (Miss. 1986).
209. Id. at 513.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 514.
212. Id. at 516.
213. State of Mississippi’s Post-Hearing Br., supra note 159, at 9 (citing Cinque Bambini,
491 So. 2d at 511–14, 516–17, 519–20 (1986), aff’d in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,
484 U.S. 469 (1988)).
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from the sea. Similarly granted were the beds and streams of
all non-tidal waters which were navigable in fact in 1817.
This act of creation consummated, the federal sovereign
rested.214
Given that the case was brought to determine the oil and gas rights
underneath non-navigable tidal waters, it is hard to read this quotation as
applying to more than the natural resources underneath tidal waters. At most,
it can be read to include groundwater underneath tidal waters. It is too far to
read this quote as applying to all groundwater within the state of Mississippi.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of the United States case upholding
Cinque Bambini also does not speak to groundwater. In Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Mississippi, the Court found that the public trust doctrine does include
waters and submerged lands influenced by the tides.215 Like Cinque Bambini,
the Court does not discuss groundwater. Rather, the Court is solely focused
on tidally-influenced waters. The Court simply holds “that the States, upon
entering the Union, were given ownership over all lands beneath waters
subject to the tide’s influence.”216 Thus, the Court did not affirm
Mississippi’s claims in its briefs that the state has ownership and authority
over all of the waters within the state, including subterranean waters.217
Other cases cited by Mississippi also do not support its argument, as
each case cited involves surface water. For instance, the state cites cases
related to the navigable Willamette River in Oregon,218 riverbeds in
Montana,219 and the Red River in Oklahoma.220 The state also cites to
Rapanos v. United States, a famous Clear Water Act case applying the
federal regulatory test for navigable waters discussed above, for the
proposition that “states control of water within its borders is ‘quintessential’
exercise of state power.”221 Again, all of these cases apply to surface water,
and Rapanos does not even address the correct navigable waters test.
Likewise, Mississippi quotes a case dealing with Alaskan submerged
lands on the state’s arctic coast in relation to the federal Submerged Lands
Act.222 Mississippi states that its “authority under the Constitution to
preserve, control, and protect groundwater located within its borders is an
‘essential attribute of sovereignty.’”223 In fact, the full quotation from United
214. Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 516–17.
215. Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 482.
216. Id. at 484.
217. See State of Mississippi’s Post-Hearing Br., supra note 162, at 9.
218. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvalis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
219. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 576 (2012).
220. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrman, 569 U.S. 614 (2013).
221. State of Mississippi’s Post-Hearing Br., supra note 162, at 10 (citing Rapanos v.
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006)).
222. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1 (1997).
223. State of Mississippi’s Post-Hearing Br., supra note 162, at 10 (citing Alaska, 521
U.S. at 5 (emphasis added)).
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States v. Alaska shows that the Court was speaking to the public trust doctrine
in relation to submerged lands under navigable waters. In talking about an
“essential attribute of sovereignty,” the Court stated, “[o]wnership of
submerged lands—which carries with it the power to control navigation,
fishing, and other public uses of water—is an essential attribute of
sovereignty.”224
Thus, while trying to make the argument that groundwater should be
treated differently, Mississippi is relying on the public trust doctrine which
traditionally is a surface water concept. In fact, neither the equal footing nor
public trust doctrines cover all surface waters, as the waterways in question
must meet the navigability for state title test or be subject to the ebb and flow
of the tides.
2. The State’s Ability to Define the Public Trust Doctrine
Mississippi’s second argument related to the public trust doctrine
relies on the premise that states have the ability to expand the contours of the
public trust within their borders. Again, Mississippi also relies on Cinque
Bambini, particularly for the court’s statement that states have plenary
authority over trust property—“once the trust was funded, so to speak, the
federal role was spent.”225 As stated above, the Supreme Court of the United
States made a similar statement in 2012, when in PPL Montana, LLC, the
Court stated in dicta that the public trust doctrine is a matter of state law, as
“[S]tates retain residual power to determine the scope of the public trust over
waters within their borders, while federal law determines riverbed title under
the equal-footing doctrine.”226
Mississippi is correct to claim that states have the power to extend
the parameters of the basic public trust outlined in Illinois Central Railroad
Company. Besides relying on Cinque Bambini and Phillips Petroleum,
Mississippi claims that its own water resources law declares that groundwater
falls within the public trust. Thus, “[p]ursuant to its public trust duties,
Mississippi has promulgated statutes and administrative regulations
controlling the withdrawal and use of Mississippi groundwater . . . and
actively regulates groundwater withdrawals.”227
In Cinque Bambini, the Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed the
extent of the public trust doctrine in the state.228 The court cited cases
declaring that trust purposes in the state included: navigation and
transportation; fishing; “bathing, swimming, and other recreational

224. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. at 5 (emphasis added).
225. Cinque Bambini P’ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 513 (Miss. 1986).
226. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603–04 (2012).
227. State of Mississippi’s Post-Hearing Br., supra note 162, at 11.
228. Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 511.
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activities”; mineral resource development; and “environmental protection
and preservation.”229
Notably, this declaration of trust purposes occurred after Mississippi
passed its water resources law in 1985. The court notes that mineral
development is included, but groundwater is not mentioned.230 Furthermore,
the court was not only relying on case law to make this list. In stating that
Mississippi’s public trust extended to “environmental protection and
preservation,” the court cited Mississippi Code Annotated sections 49-27-3
and 49-27-5, which speak to the preservation of coastal wetlands within the
state.231 Thus, it could be inferred that the court did look to statutory law to
determine the scope of the public trust, and thus, could have included the
groundwater management provisions if it thought the provisions fit within
the trust.
Further, subsequent decisions in the state have not identified
groundwater as a public trust resource. For instance, in 2016, the Mississippi
Supreme Court stated that, upon statehood, the state took “title to the
tidelands and navigable waters which had been held by the United States
prior to statehood was conveyed to Mississippi in trust and became
immediately vested, subject to the trust.”232
That said, although there is no evidence of the Mississippi Supreme
Court recognizing groundwater as a public trust resource after the 1985 water
resources act was passed, other states have attempted to claim the public trust
doctrine extends to groundwater. These cases have had mixed success.
In 2000, the Hawaii Supreme Court determined that the public trust
doctrine applied to all water resources within the state.233 The case involved
a dispute regarding the water distributed by the Waiahole Ditch System, a
major irrigation infrastructure on O’ahu.234 The court established the validity
of the public trust doctrine by holding that article XI, section 1 and article
XI, section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution adopted the public trust doctrine as
a fundamental principle of constitutional law in Hawaii.235 In its ruling, the
court declined to carve out a groundwater exception to the trust.236 Thus, the
Court held that public trust doctrine applied to all water resources, unlimited
by any surface-ground distinction.237

229. Id. at 512.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. State v. Murphy, 202 So. 3d 1243, 1252 (Miss. 2016) (quoting Sec’y of State v.
Wiesenberg, 633 So. 2d 983, 987 (Miss. 1994)).
233. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000).
234. Id. at 422.
235. Id. at 443–44.
236. Id. at 447.
237. Id.
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In 2018, the California Court of Appeals for the Third District found
that groundwater could be part of the public trust in certain circumstances.238
In this case, the Environmental Law Foundation (“ELF”) asked the court to
rule on whether the County of Siskiyou (“County”) and the State Water
Resources Control Board (“Board”) have a public trust duty under
California’s common law to consider any potential negative impacts of
groundwater well permits on the navigable Scott River.239 Thus, ELF was not
claiming at this time that the County and Board had violated any duty under
the public trust doctrine.240 Rather, it was simply seeking to establish that a
public trust duty applied when groundwater extractions were negatively
affecting a navigable waterway.241
In its ruling, the court relied heavily on the Mono Lake case
mentioned above. The decision in the Mono Lake case involved California’s
well-established water rights system, which had been codified in the 1913
Water Commission Act.242 The water right in question was a water diversion
from non-navigable tributaries not covered by the public trust doctrine that
would provide water to the City of Los Angeles.243 However, the diversion
caused the water level in Mono Lake to drop, harming its scenic and
ecological attributes.244 Noting that both the integrity of the lake and Los
Angeles’s need for water were important and valuable, the court ruled that
the public trust must be considered, even if the diversions were from nontrust waters, due to the effect of the diversions on navigable, public trust
waters.245
Based on the Mono Lake decision, the court found fault with the
County’s argument that the public trust doctrine does not cover
groundwater.246 The court noted that the public trust doctrine does not apply
to all groundwater, but when a diversion is from a non-navigable water
source and affects a navigable waterway, the public trust is implicated.247
Thus, “the determinative fact is the impact of the activity on the public trust
resource” and “whether the challenged activity allegedly harms a navigable
waterway.”248
Finally, earlier this year, a Minnesota court found that the public trust
doctrine did not apply to groundwater.249 In the case, White Bear Lake
238. Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393, 402 (Ct.
App. 2018).
239. Id. at 396.
240. Id. at 395–96.
241. Id. at 396.
242. Id. at 401.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 711 (Cal. 1983).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 712.
248. Envtl. Law Found., 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 402–03.
249. White Bear Lake Restoration Ass’n v. Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 928 N.W.2d 351,
367 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019).
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Restoration Association brought an action against the Minnesota Department
of Natural Resources (DNR), alleging that groundwater-appropriation
permits issued by DNR caused the lake’s water levels to drop in violation of
the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA).250 White Bear
Homeowners Association (WBHA) intervened as plaintiff, additionally
claiming a violation of the common law public trust doctrine.251 WBHA
alleged that the increased groundwater appropriations materially and
adversely affected the environment, specifically the lake and aquifer.252
Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs holding that DNR violated MERA, state water law, and the public
trust doctrine. 253
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the exclusive
vehicle for a MERA challenge to groundwater-appropriation permits was in
the provision governing actions against the state.254 Furthermore, the court
determined, as a matter of first impression, that the public trust doctrine did
not apply to the groundwater near the lake.255 The Court stated that any
expansion of the public trust doctrine to encompass groundwater as
“navigable waters” was beyond their authority as an error-correcting court.256
Additionally, the Court indicated that “the lake and the aquifer are
hydrologically connected. That is why MERA applies to the groundwater.
But that does not make groundwater ‘navigable.’”257 Therefore, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.258
Therefore, it would be within the Supreme Court of Mississippi’s
power to rule on whether the state’s public trust included groundwater. The
problem for Mississippi is that it just has not done so.
V. WHY NOT EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT?
Given the flaws in Mississippi’s arguments, one might wonder why
the state is not seeking an equitable apportionment. In its previous case,
Mississippi asked for monetary damages, but if not, equitable apportionment.
However, it decided not to ask for equitable apportionment in the alternative
in this case, leaving some to wonder why.
In fact, in its initial decisions in this case, the Special Master has
hinted at the potential folly in Mississippi foregoing an equitable
apportionment. In its 2016 opinion on Tennessee’s motion to dismiss, the
Special Master stated:
250. Id. at 356.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 356–57.
253. Id. at 357–58.
254. Id. at 352.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 364–67.
257. Id. at 367.
258. Id.
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Because, under federal common law, equitable
apportionment is necessary to grant relief in a dispute over
interstate water in the absence of an interstate compact – and
Mississippi has made it explicit that it does not seek an
equitable apportionment of the Aquifer – dismissal would
likely be warranted under Rule 12.259
Likewise, in its 2018 opinion on Tennessee’s motion for summary
judgment, the Special Master stated:
Understandably, Mississippi wants MLGW to stop
pumping. Mississippi has spent years making a long and
arduous journey, navigating federal courts, all in an attempt
to protect what it believes it rightfully owns. Now,
Mississippi has come ashore in this Supreme Court Original
Action. But by rejecting equitable apportionment,
Mississippi might have abandoned the only mechanism for
relief. Mississippi may have burned its boats.260
Given the weaknesses with Mississippi’s claims, why then did the
state choose to forego equitable apportionment? First, it may simply be that
Mississippi wants monetary damages instead of the equitable remedy it
would receive by the Court apportioning water in the aquifer. Further, some
clues could have been given by the Court in its previous denial of
Mississippi’s motion for leave to file a bill of complaint after the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in its case against Memphis. In that denial, the Court cited
two cases.261 The first citation was to note 9 in Virginia v. Maryland, which
states that “Federal common law governs interstate bodies of water, ensuring
that the water is equitably apportioned between the States and that neither
State harms the other’s interest in the river.”262
The Court also cited note 13 of Colorado v. New Mexico, which
states, “[o]ur cases establish that a state seeking to prevent or enjoin a
diversion by another state bears the burden of proving that the diversion will
cause it ‘real or substantial injury or damage.’”263
The reference to “real or substantial injury or damage” may be what
spooked Mississippi. As noted in the United States’ brief, the Court has
required the complaining state in equitable apportionment cases to “make
concrete allegations about adverse impacts to its present or certain future uses
259. Mem. of Decision on Tennessee’s Mot. to Dismiss, Memphis and Memphis Light,
Gas, & Water, Division’s Mot. to Dismiss, and Mississippi’s Mot. to Exclude, supra note 156,
at 1.
260. Mem. of Decision on Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 203, at 26–27.
261. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 559 U.S. 901 (2010).
262. Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 74 n.9 (2003).
263. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187 n.13 (1982).
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of the disputed water.”264 Mississippi would likely have trouble proving harm
under traditional water law, as well as under the standards the Court has
developed for equitable apportionment.
Water law has traditionally not been forward-looking, a large flaw in
the system that currently regulates water use in the United States. Courts have
traditionally not been concerned with future problems, choosing rather to
focus on the here and now. As Tennessee points out in its post-hearing brief,
Mississippi provides no detail as to how the pumping in Memphis has
interfered with the state’s current use of water beside vague claims about the
cone of depression and the need to drill deeper wells.265
Under equitable apportionment, the Court has required complaining
states to show a substantial injury, and the burden to show this is higher than
a private party would have to show in a regular litigation due to the fact that
the lawsuit involves two quasi-sovereigns.266 Thus, the complaining state
must show by clear and convincing evidence that it is threatened with a
serious invasion of its rights.267
While it is true that water is leaving the state of Mississippi, it is not
clear from the state’s pleadings that it has sustained a substantial enough
interference with its own use of the aquifer to satisfy the standard of equitable
apportionment. Neither does it seem to meet the burden of recent water law
cases based on the theory of conversion. For instance, in 2015 the Southern
District of Ohio stated that “the standard for conversion of groundwater is
that Plaintiff must show that Defendant’s actions . . . interferes with
Plaintiff’s reasonable use of the groundwater beneath its property. This
standard is different than the standard in trespass, which considers
interference with the entire property, including the subsurface.”268
Further, Mississippi’s own management of water resources may
hinder the state in the Court’s review. While the state was progressive in
adopting a permit system for groundwater use in the state, it is rumored that
the state has never denied a groundwater use permit.269 Likewise, although
groundwater permits limit the amount of water that can be used, the state
does not require permit holders to monitor how much water they are using.270
Only recently, when faced with severely low water levels in the Mississippi
264. Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21, Mississippi v. Tennessee, No. 09143 (U.S. May 12, 2015).
265. Post Hearing Br. of the State of Tennessee at 31–32, Mississippi v. Tennessee, No.
114-143 (U.S Sept 19, 2019).
266. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2514 (2018).
267. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. at 187 n.13; New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S.
296, 309 (1921).
268. Little Hocking Water Ass’n v. E.I. du Pont Nemours and Co., 91 F. Supp. 3d 940,
983 (S.D. Ohio 2015).
269. Within the author’s personal knowledge based on personal conversations at
Mississippi Water Security Institute meetings.
270. See generally Delta Voluntary Metering Program, MISS. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY,
https://www.mdeq.ms.gov/water/water-availability-and-use/delta-voluntary-meteringprogram/ [https://perma.cc/H9C2-26ZW].
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Alluvial Aquifer, has the state asked 10% of permit holders in the Mississippi
Delta to monitor their use. All of these reasons may have prompted
Mississippi to pursue a property-based claim rather than seek equitable
apportionment.271
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Mississippi has taken a risk in foregoing an equitable
apportionment in lieu of its sovereign ownership claims. As stated above, this
decision could have been strategic, as Mississippi would have a hard time
proving injury and would not be able to seek monetary damages with an
equitable apportionment claim. However, its case has some serious flaws, not
the least of which is the state’s management of its own water resources. The
state seriously underutilizes the strength of its own permit system by not
denying any applications for permits and by not requiring water users to
monitor their water use. Both of these decisions by the state leave its
groundwater resources susceptible to unsustainable use.
Mississippi’s case also relies incorrectly on two surface water
doctrines to make the claim that it owns all the groundwater within the state:
the equal footing doctrine and the public trust doctrine. First, the equal
footing doctrine has not been extended to groundwater. Rather, it only applies
to navigable waters and the submerged lands below them. In comparison, the
public trust doctrine can be expanded to cover groundwater. However, while
the state claims ownership of groundwater based on its water withdrawal
permit law, Mississippi courts have not recognized that the public trust has
been expanded to groundwater in the state, even in cases decided after the
water withdrawal law was passed.
Finally, though not discussed previously in this paper, one needs to
note that there are strong policy reasons to deny Mississippi’s assertions that
monetary damages are due. What would the evidentiary burden be in these
cases, especially if more than two states were involved or if the complaining
state’s own pumping were affecting the flow of water? Would states be able
to afford to pay these damages, and would this promote the best and most
efficient use of water? For these reasons, as well as the ones discussed above,
Mississippi’s lawsuit against Tennessee is seriously flawed.

271. Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 261, at 2.

